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ABSTRACT 
Effet utile as a general principle of EU law is always “bound” on the dilemmas of the 
effective enforcement of EU law, more particularly, on the dilemmas of the judicial 
protection of EU-based rights through national and also EU remedies. This article 
is centered on three topics: fi rst, on the concept of decentralized enforcement of EU 
law and meaning of the principle of effectiveness (effet utile) thereof; second, on the 
national practice of the effective enforcement of EU law from a standpoint of private 
parties; and, third, on a national practice of the preliminary reference procedure’s 
referrals in the context of national courts’ duty of loyal cooperation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Effet utile or the principle of effectiveness requires the effective protection of 
EU rights and the effective enforcement of EU law in national courts.1 Thus in 
this article effet utile is used in its broadest meaning and above all in the con-
text of the national judicial practice. Therefore, the “initial narrow defi nition” 
of the requirement of effectiveness that national rules must not render the exer-
cise of Union rights virtually impossible or excessively diffi cult,2 is mentioned 
merely as a starting point in a much broader discussion regarding national 
judicial practice while enforcing Union rights. After a decade of Slovene mem-
bership in the EU, the “activity of national courts” has to be critically assessed 
especially from a standpoint of private parties while claiming their EU rights 
on the “national level” of the judicial protection. The term “private parties” is 
in this article related to the concept of individual rights and it is thus used for 
analyzing the system of the judicial protection of both, natural and legal per-
sons. In essence, the main concern of this article is the effective enforcement 
of EU law before national courts. I will endeavor to show that albeit national 
courts are without restraint applying EU law, the level of effective judicial 
protection of private parties’ EU-based rights in Slovenia must nevertheless 
be improved. 
2.  EFFET UTILE AND PRIVATE PARTIES’ JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION
There are two main means by which private parties can enforce EU norms, 
that is centrally and decentrally.3 Centralized enforcement refers to the ability 
of private parties to bring an action before the EU’s own courts (the Court of 
Justice and General Court).4 This was the primary method of enforcement 
envisaged by the Treaty of Rome,5 however access of private parties to the 
EU courts has been and still is very limited. According to Article 263 TFEU, 
private parties can fi le annulment action under extremely strict locus stan-
1  Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2006, 
p. 418.
2  Ibid., p. 423.
3  Dougan, M., National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and 
Differentiation, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2004, p. 2.
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.; further: Tamm, D., The History of the Court of Justice of the European Union Since 
its Origin, in Rosas, A., et al., The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses 
and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law, T. M. C. Asser Press, 2012, p. 19. 
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di rules as they can challenge only the legality of acts addressed to them or 
which are of direct and individual concern to them or the legality of regula-
tory acts which are of direct concern to them, and do not entail implementing 
measures. Similarly, constrained conditions are also established under Article 
265 TFEU, which provides an action for a wrongful failure to act of the EU 
institution. Since the plea of illegality (exceptio illegalis) as defi ned by Article 
241 TFEU does not constitute an independent cause of action, it cannot be 
regarded as a relevant private party’s (additional) legal remedy. Moreover, the 
infringement procedure provided for in Article 258 TFEU is strictly objective 
in nature, meaning that the ECJ decides (only) whether the breach of EU law 
alleged by the Commission has occurred or not.6 The Commission’s function 
is to ensure that Member States give effect to the Treaties and the provisions 
adopted by the institutions thereunder and to obtain a declaration of any failure 
to fulfi l the obligations deriving therefrom with a view to bringing them to an 
end.7 Consequently, the Commission’s discretion on whether to bring an action 
against a Member State is very wide, which means that private parties cannot 
in no way force the Commission to bring an infringement case before the 
EU judicature.8 Thus infringement procedure cannot either be regarded as an 
effective private parties’ remedy under EU law. Finally, although Union’s lia-
bility system with damages actions against the EU set by Articles 268 and 340 
TFEU is an important segment of private parties’ judicial protection under EU 
law, a subsisting drawback lies in the fact that the only order available is the 
award for compensation for damage caused by a Union institution.9 Moreover, 
private parties’ “success rate” is very low, since out of many claims instituted 
under Article 340 (2) TFEU only few have actually resulted in an award of 
compensation.10
On the other hand, at the time of drafting of the Treaties of Rome the impor-
tance of adoption of Nicola Catalano’s proposal inspired by Italian law that 
national courts should be able to submit questions of interpretation of (then) 
Community law to the ECJ in order to “secure uniformity” was not foreseen.11 
In other words, the “EU founding fathers” did not discern that the preliminary 
6  Prete, L., Smulders, B., The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings, Common Mar-
ket Law Review, Vol. 47, št. 1, 2010, p. 13.
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid., p. 15. 
9  Ward, A., Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 368.
10  Ibid., p. 367; see also Aalto, P., Public Liability in EU Law: Brasserie, Bergaderm and 
Beyond, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2011, p. 148.  
11  Tamm, D., in Rosas, A., et al., op. cit., p. 19. 
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reference procedure would serve as principal procedure for private parties’ 
judicial protection. Only through the usage of preliminary reference procedure 
the ECJ has started to cooperate with the courts of the Member States, which 
have thus became the ordinary courts in matters of Community (now EU) 
law. Therefore, on the decentralized level, the national courts have become 
“fi rst-in-line EU courts”, in most cases involving private parties as litigants.12 
Although not without its pitfalls, according to the EU judicial architecture the 
primary venue for private parties’ judicial protection is (still) the decentral-
ized level of the EU judicial system with the essential cooperation of national 
courts.  
On this point it should be briefl y recalled that the ECJ has involved the national 
courts and made them allies in the enforcement of Community (now EU) law, 
fi rst on the basis of the principles of direct effect and supremacy of EU law.13 
This was the initial stage. A signifi cant step further in the process of “Europe-
anization” of national courts was made with the establishment of the effet utile 
requirements. Even though in the early case law ECJ ruled that it was for the 
national legal system to determine the primary conditions under which rights 
granted by the EU (then EC) law were to be protected where no relevant rules 
of EU law existed, this principle of national autonomy was later on qualifi ed 
by the dual requirement of equivalence and effectiveness.14 The principle of 
equivalence requires that claims based on EU (then EC) law must be subject to 
rules which are no less favorable than those governing similar claims based on 
national law. 15 Due to effectiveness’ condition, national rules must not render 
the exercise of Union (then Community) rights virtually impossible or exces-
sively diffi cult.16 Thus the requirement of effectiveness is a separate form and 
applies in addition to the requirement of equivalence as it “demands” from 
national courts the insurance that they give adequate effect to EU (then EC) 
law in cases arising before them.17 This “simple formula has proven the most 
volatile weapon in the ECJ’s armoury”, since according to its jurisprudence 
the principle of effectiveness (effet utile) now encompasses a vast corpus of 
rules such as upon requirements of the private parties right to reparation in 
respect of losses suffered through a breach of EU law for which the Member 
12  Claes, M., The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2006, p. 59.
13  Ibid., p. 41.
14  Craig, P., de Burca, G., EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 305-306.
15  Ibid. 
16  Tridimas, T., op. cit., p. 423. 
17  Ibid., p. 422. 
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State can be held responsible; regarding effective interim protection of one’s 
EU rights pending their fi nal determination by a competent judicial authority 
or the recovery of charges levied in breach of EU rules by the Member States; 
the imposition of time-limits restricting the opportunity for claimants to assert 
their right before the national court or national rules limiting the back-payment 
of compensation or other fi nancial benefi ts.18   
Further on it must be emphasized, that after the Lisbon Treaty amendments, 
second paragraph of the Article 19 TEU explicitly stipulates that Member 
States must provide remedies suffi cient to ensure effective legal protection in 
the fi elds covered by Union law. This amendment is important as previously 
solely relevant Article 10 TEC (now third paragraph of the Article 4 TEU) 
far less stringently required from Member States to take all appropriate mea-
sures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfi lment of the obligations 
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of 
the Community and to abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty. According to this Lisbon Treaty 
amendment “duty of loyal cooperation” explicitly demands of Member States 
that on the decentralized level of the EU system of judicial protection (also) 
for private parties provide effective legal remedies in order to ensure legal pro-
tection of (granted) EU rights. This stipulation of the relevant ECJ’s effet utile 
case law in second paragraph of the Article 19 TEU is moreover signifi cant 
due to the structure of the relevant provision. If, on the one hand, the ECJ (and 
the other two Union courts) on the centralized level of the EU judicial enforce-
ment should be considered as the principal head of EU judicial jurisdiction 
(fi rst paragraph), on the other hand national courts on the decentralized level 
also form its inevitable counterpart (second paragraph). This is very important 
as Union Courts only exercise their jurisdiction in actions and proceedings 
enumerated in the treaties and in the acts adopted on the basis thereof.19 The 
settlement of the disputes not falling under the scope of the treaties is there-
fore a matter for the courts of the Member States, as follows from Article 274 
TFEU and also from Article 267 TFEU.20
Moreover, for a proper application of effet utile in practice it must be briefl y re-
called the importance of the ECJ’ case law regarding the interpretation of the 
fundamental right of effective judicial protection as it derives from the com-
mon constitutional traditions of the Member States and Article 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter ECHR). The fundamental 
18  Dougan, M., National..., op. cit., p. 27 and 32-33. 
19  Barents, R., The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol. 47, 2010, p. 714. 
20  Ibid.
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right of effective judicial protection has to be interpreted and applied as a duty 
in the hands of the courts to provide effective protection of the rights which in-
dividuals derive from EU law. Therefore, there is an evident nexus between the 
effet utile’s requirements and application of individual’s right of effective judi-
cial protection. More precisely, the right of the effective judicial protection and 
the principle of effectiveness of EU law often coincide as the effective remedy 
offered to the individual for the protection of his EU rights, contributes to en-
forcing the correct application and the enforcement of EU law.21 The right to 
an effective judicial protection through the ECJ’s application of Articles 6 and 
13 ECHR and its further incorporation in Article 47 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU, is therefore individual’s powerful tool in the context 
of claiming that national rule has the restrictive effect on (the enforcement) a 
particular (mainly substantive) EU right. Finally, although strictly speaking ef-
fet utile’s requirements are not (always) equivalent to a broader general duty of 
co-operation of national courts, the term effet utile in this article is nonetheless 
used in its general sense, encompassing all relevant ECJ’s jurisprudence deriv-
ing from interpretation of Article 10 TEC, effectiveness principle and right to 
an effective judicial protection before the Union Courts. 
As it follows from ECJ’s case law, general duties of cooperation imposed on 
the national courts in their capacity as EU courts include: the duty to apply 
EU law and protect rights which it confers on individuals and to accordingly 
set aside any provision of national law which may confl ict with it; the duty 
not to allow state authorities to rely on national laws which are inconsistent 
with directives which should have been implemented; the duty to interpret and 
apply national laws as far as possible so as to make them compatible with the 
requirements of EU law; the duty to give effective remedies for breach of EU 
law in the form of compensation; the duty to ensure that reparation of loss or 
damage sustained as a result of a violation of EU law by the Member State 
is adequate; the duty to apply EU law under the conditions, which are anal-
ogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of similar nature 
and importance; the duty to ensure the legal protection which persons derive 
from direct effect of the provisions of EU law; the duty to grant interim relief 
in order to protect rights which individuals derive from EU law; the duty to 
protect EU fundamental rights in the sphere of EU law; the duty to respect the 
jurisdiction of EU institutions and to avoid confl icting decisions; the duty to 
refer to the ECJ questions as to the validity of EU law and, the duty to raise 
questions of EU law of their own motion where national law provides the same 
duty or power.22
21  Claes, M., op. cit., p. 138.
22  See ibid., p. 67. 
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3.  DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND 
NATIONAL COURTS
As Slovenia has joined the EU on the 1st of May 2004, national courts have 
been practicing their “EU mandate” for almost ten years now. After a decade 
of this national practice it is high time to assess the private parties’ actual ac-
cess to the effective enforcement of EU law on the national level as envisaged 
though the (“decentralized”) EU judicial protection system. Additionally, it 
must be analyzed if private parties in practice often claim that national pro-
cedural rules constrain their enforcement of EU law on the relevant national 
level.
At the outset, sector specifi c nature of EU law is also refl ected in the fi nal 
application of EU law by national courts. In other words, core EU fi elds of 
law which are intensively regulated on the EU level, logically represent most 
commonly disputed issues also before national administrative bodies and con-
sequently before national courts. For example, in disputes regarding breaches 
of competition rules23 or intellectual property rights24, national courts cannot 
obviate the application of relevant EU legal norms and subsequent vast corpus 
of ECJ and General Court’s case law. Similarly, this could be claimed for some 
other branches of EU administrative law regarding asylum procedure and im-
migration rights, claims for citizenship, taxation (indirect tax, excise duty) or 
environmental issues.25 Moreover, next to competition protection offi ce (Slo-
vene Competition Protection Agency), some other relevant market regulators 
such as Securities Market Agency, Insurance Supervision Agency or The Slo-
vene Institute of Auditors are deciding on different fi nancial market structure 
issues that are intensively regulated or harmonized by various EU regulations 
and directives. Since their fi nal decisions can be judicially reviewed before 
the Administrative Court on the fi rst instance and before the Supreme Court 
acting as the court of appeal subsequent case law often includes direct referral 
to relevant EU law. 
It should be stressed, that due to vast economic power of private parties as 
litigants in this “market structure” disputes, the quality of legal representation 
is generally very good and it instigates also better reasoning of the fi nal judi-
23  See Supreme Court decisions G 7/2013, 3 December 2013; G 9/2012, 26 November 2013; 
G 47/2010, 11 June 2013.  
24  See Supreme Court decisions III Ips 68/2010, 11 October 2011; X Ips 420/2010, 12 Sep-
tember 2012; X Ips 221/2012, 12 September 2012.  
25  See Knez, R., Analiza prakse uporabe prava EU v sodnih postopkih v Sloveniji, v Zborni-
ku: Dvajseto posvetovanje o aktualni problematiki s področja gospodarskega prava, Portorož, 
2012, Pravna fakulteta Univerze v Mariboru, p. 105.
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cial decisions which are applying EU law or are dealing with the enforcement 
of EU rights. In this context, Supreme Court’s decision G 8/2009 should be 
mentioned in which the plaintiff claimed incompatibility of Article 62 of (na-
tional) Health Care and Health Insurance Act with Article 8(3) of First Council 
Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 197326 and with Articles 29 and 39 of Council 
Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 199227. In the administrative procedure of ju-
dicial protection the plaintiff fi led a legal action that the Insurance Supervision 
Agency’s decision on a conditional withdrawal of authorization to perform the 
tasks of certifi ed actuary should be abolished. In essence he claimed that he did 
not violate the rules of the actuarial profession since the (breached) national leg-
islation (Article 62 of Health Care and Health Insurance Act) was incompatible 
with the relevant EU directives. He argued that the relevant directive’s provisions 
had direct effect and this enabled him to disregard national law and to apply 
solely the relevant EU legal norm in his fi nal expertise. It must be stressed that 
while adjudicating on the plaintiffs’ claim, the ECJ in the course of action for a 
failure of a Member State to fulfi l obligations (Article 258 TFEU) ruled that by 
transposing into national law incorrectly and incompletely First Council Direc-
tive,28 the Republic of Slovenia failed to fulfi l its obligations under Article 8(3) 
of Directive 73/239 and Articles 29 and 39 of Directive 92/49.29 The Supreme 
Court confi rmed the suffi ciently clear, precise and unconditional nature of the 
disputed Article 8 of Directive 73/239 and Articles 29 and 39 of Directive 92/49 
and consequently decided that the legal action was justifi ed since the Insurance 
Supervision Agency had based its contested decision on the Article 62 of Health 
Care and Health Insurance Act and thus created an infringement of substantive 
law (erroneous application of substantive law). 
On the other hand, in labor disputes private parties are as well increasing-
ly arguing their claims on the relevant EU legal basis, especially due to the 
duty of consistent interpretation (principle of harmonious interpretation) or 
the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with directives in hori-
zontal situations, thus involving two private parties before a domestic court.30 
26  First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of 
direct insurance other than life assurance, OJ 1973 L 228, p. 3.
27  Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending 
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC OJ 1992 L 228, p. 1.
28  See Knez, R., Analiza prakse uporabe prava EU v Sloveniji – delovni in socialni spori, 
Pravosodni bilten, No. 1, XXXIV, 2013, p. 28. 
29  Case C-185/11, European Commission v Republic of Slovenia, not yet published. 
30  See Knez, R., Analiza prakse uporabe prava EU v Sloveniji – delovni in socialni spori, op. 
cit., p. 28. 
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Moreover, in an important social security case, the Supreme Court has been 
dealing with the “delicate” question of the reimbursement of medical costs for 
hospital treatment in another Member State from the national health insurance 
system.31 The case concerned a plaintiff’s claim over the rejection of reim-
bursement her costs for medical treatment in Italy by national Compulsory 
Health Insurance (the defendant). The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s 
revision and annulled the fi rst and second instance courts’ decisions (and re-
turned the case to the court of fi rst instance for re-trial), by which the lover 
instance courts rejected the plaintiff’s claim. The Supreme Court put forward 
that ECJ’s case law must be considered as the health services provided for 
payment fi rmly fall within the provisions on the freedom to provide services. 
It further on stipulated that according to acquis communautaire in each case 
it has to be assessed whether hospital or outpatient (non-hospital) care is at 
issue, since the system which allows the insured individual to request from 
the national compulsory health insurance company the reimbursement of the 
cost of medical services carried out in another Member State of EU in ac-
cordance with the rules (and at the price) of the home country, in principle 
applies only to outpatient (non-hospital) health services. Therefore, Member 
States may require prior authorization for reimbursement from the national 
system of hospital treatment in another Member State. However, in the line of 
the reasoning Supreme Court refused to commence the preliminary reference 
procedure regarding compliance of relevant Health Care and Health Insurance 
Act and Compulsory Health Insurance Rules with TFEU with the argumenta-
tion that “the scope of a preliminary ruling is limited exclusively to the EU law 
and does not cover national law as from the division of jurisdiction between 
the ECJ and the national courts of EU Member States it follows that the ECJ 
in the preliminary ruling proceedings cannot deal with the issues of national 
law.”32 However, this part of the decision is further analyzed and critically 
assessed in the subsequent heading of this article.
The suffi cient corpus of case law (evident from the national jurisprudence da-
tabase) leads to a conclusion that in the context of civil law disputes, private 
parties are commonly referring to different sources of EU “civil” law and sub-
sequently to their EU rights. Since the policy of “EU civil justice” is primarily 
focused on the judicial cooperation in cross border litigation, private parties 
are primarily concerned with the effective enforcement of different legislative 
instruments such as for example regulation Brussels I or Brussels II,33 that 
31  See Supreme Court decision VIII Ips 295/2011, 4 December 2012. 
32  See par. 11, op. cit. 
33  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the re-
cognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 12, p. 1; Coun-
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have been put in place at EU level over the last decade. From the perspective 
of harmonization of the Member States’ national procedural law the estab-
lishment of two autonomous European civil procedures in. e. the European 
Small Claims Procedure and the European order for payment procedure is of 
particular importance.34 Since the latter has been already “disputed” on the 
appellate stage before the High Courts it could be argued that private parties’ 
awareness regarding the existence and effectiveness of this optional procedure 
is slowly growing.35 An increasing trend of appeal cases concerning other EU 
instruments on judicial cooperation in civil matters also enables a conclusion 
on a satisfactory level of application of other relevant regulations in national 
judicial practice.36 Furthermore, next to a signifi cant number of cases regard-
ing Brussels I regulation dealing with issues of recognition and enforcement 
of judgments given in another Member State,37 the Slovene Supreme Court 
extensively ruled in a case III Ips 164/2009 on the proper ratione temporis ap-
plication.38 In another case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the scope and 
meaning of a disputed parties’ prorogation agreement according to conditions 
set by the relevant Article 23 of Brussels I regulation.39 In addition of the said 
regulation, case law on Brussels II regulation should be mentioned in the con-
text of the second posed national preliminary question, as the High Court of 
cil Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, OJ L 338, p. 1.
34  Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199, p. 1; Regulation (EC) 
No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a 
European order for payment procedure, OJ L 399, p. 1.
35  See High Court decisions VSK II Ip 200/2010, 21 May 2010 and VSK Cp 474/2009, 26 
May 2009. 
36  See High Court decisions VSK II Ip 200/2010, 21 May 2010 and VSK II Ip 4333/2011, 23 
November 2011 concerning Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, 
OJ L 143, p. 15; see also Supreme Court decision Cpg 2/2008, 5 October 2010; regarding case-
law on Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the 
courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 
174, p. 1, see for example Supreme Court decision II Ips 809/2007, 14 February 2008 and High 
Court decision VSK I Cp 1182/2005, 27 February 2007. 
37  See Supreme Court decisions Cp 16/2012 and 17/2012, 10 January 2013; Cp 7/2010, 31 
January 2011; Cpg 5/2013, 10 September 2013; Cpg 1/2008, 15 April 2008; Cpg 3/2010, 6 July 
2010; Cpg 4/2010, 13 July 2010; Cpg 5/2009, 9 March 2010; Cpg 5/2006, 26 February 2007 or 
Cp 22/2008, 15 January 2009.    
38  Supreme Court decision III Ips 164/2008, 3 February 2009. 
39  Supreme Court decision III Ips 54/2013, 17 December 2012. 
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Maribor commenced the preliminary reference procedure with regard of the 
scope of Article 20 (see subsequent heading of this Article).40 Even though that 
in the context of private parties’ “confl icts of law” disputes, correct application 
of regulations Rome I and Rome II is of crucial importance,41 it is diffi cult to 
estimate their actual use in national judicial practice due to their rather recent 
entry into force.42 
Finally, in the scope of EU criminal law, the Supreme Court has been deal-
ing with some issues on “European arrest warrant” as the relevant framework 
decision43 was implemented by the national “Cooperation in Criminal Mat-
ters with the Member States of the European Union Act”.44 Nevertheless, this 
partial “EU law immunity” in the judicial practice of national criminal courts 
might be changed with the Lisbon Treaty’ de-pillarization and its further es-
tablishment of solid grounds for advanced harmonization of this fi eld of law.   
On the other hand, it must be emphasized that despite the satisfactory level of EU 
law application and its subsequent enforcement before national courts, private 
parties’ objection regarding the breach of EU “principle of effectiveness” is not 
used in practice or is at least not recognized by national courts. For example, 
according to national case law data base, many national cases are dealing with 
issues of proper application and enforcement of EU law (such as questions deal-
ing with direct effect, limits of duty of consistent interpretation, effect of direc-
tives’ vertical and horizontal relations, etc.) while only one case is listed under 
the search form of the principle of effectiveness.45 Moreover, this case has been 
in the earlier stage of the proceedings suspended because of the commencement 
of the preliminary ruling procedure and the ECJ in essence qualifi ed the dispute 
as a subject matter of proper use of effectiveness principle. However, just one 
case accurately qualifi ed as the dispute regarding effectiveness principle does 
40  See High Court decision VSM III Cp 1836/2009, 13 October 2009; see also Supreme 
Court decision Cp 17/2008, 2 October 2008. 
41  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, p. 6; Regulation 
(EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199, p. 40.
42  See Articles 28 and 29 of Rome I regulation and Articles 31 and 32 of Rome II regulation; 
with regard to ratione temporis application of Rome II regulation see also Supreme Court 
decision II Ips 1001/2007, 16 December 2010.   
43  2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States OJ L 190, p. 1.
44  See Supreme Court decisions I Ips 123/2005, 19 May 2005; I Ips 174/2008, 15 May 2008; 
I Ips 336/2005, 3 November 2005; I Ips 226/2006, 13 July 2006.  
45  See Supreme Court decision X Ips 18/2013, 19 September 2013. 
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not prove that national rules never render the exercise of Union rights virtual-
ly impossible or excessively diffi cult. Quite the opposite. The above mentioned 
case refl ects the actual limited knowledge of meaning and scope of effet utile 
principle in national judicial practice. It must be emphasized that it is high time 
to improve the actual level of private parties’ awareness of their right to effective 
judicial protection in the scope of effective enforcement of their EU rights before 
national courts. On the other hand, national judges acting in their capacity of 
iura novit curia must more frequently “perceive” the actual objection of denial 
of effective enforcement of EU rights and act correspondingly. 
A practice of claims on damages due to a breach of EU law must be further 
scrutinized as it serves as an example of discussed “reduced awareness” of 
claimable rights in the context of possible remedies under EU law. According 
to records from the national case law database thus far on the appellate stage 
before High Courts there has been no single case dealing with private party’s 
claiming state’s liability for damages due to the suffi ciently serious breach of 
EU law. On this point it must be stressed that it is highly unlikely that Slovenia 
within 10 years of practicing its “duty of fulfi lment of EU obligations” never 
breached EU law. As was previously discussed in the context of the “actuary 
case”, already this particular actuary as an aggrieved party could have claimed 
damages for breach of EU law, since Slovenia failed to transpose correctly 
and suffi ciently the relevant directives into national law. Moreover, although 
fi rst instance courts decisions are not recorded in the case law database, it is 
highly unlikely that none of the parties never appealed before the High Court, 
especially since the subject matter on damages due to breach of EU law is 
a complex one and also distinctive from “classical” cases on state’s liability 
under public liability regime in national law as stipulated in Article 26 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia.46 This lack of jurisprudence on “EU 
damages claims” against the state confi rms that it is still much easier for pri-
vate parties as litigants if “the relevant EU remedy” is incorporated  in the 
form of a national legal remedy as it was done in the case of claiming liability 
for damages due to a breach of EU competition law. Pursuant to Article 62 of 
the Prevention of Restriction of Competition Act, the aggrieved party can sue 
for damages on this legal basis also for damages arising from violation of Ar-
ticle 101 and 102 TFEU. 47 In the context of this decentralized private enforce-
46  Everyone has the right to compensation for damage caused through unlawful actions in 
connection with the performance of any function or other activity by a person or body perfor-
ming such function or activity under state authority, local community authority or as a bearer 
of public authority. – First paragraph of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Offi cial 
Gazette RS No. 33/91-I, 42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, and 47/13.
47  Anyone violating, either deliberately or out of negligence, the provision of Articles 6 or 
9 of this Act or Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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ment of EU competition law, it seems that this explicit and additional “nation-
al” legal basis for bringing an action for damages arising from breach of EU 
competition law is from a standpoint of private parties’ effective enforcement 
of EU law very important. This argument is nevertheless further evidenced 
by the High Courts’ jurisprudence on damage liability due to violation of EU 
competition law.48 
Last, but not the least, in this discussion on effective application and enforce-
ment of EU law before national courts, the ECJ’ Pelati case has to be ana-
lyzed more precisely as this is the fi rst national case dealing with effectiveness 
principle in national practice.49 From the facts of the case it follows that in the 
taxation procedure in cases of mergers or divisions of companies, the Slovene 
tax authority rejected Pelati Ltd.’s (hereafter Pelati) application for the grant of 
tax advantages on the occasion of a division of an undertaking. The reason for 
rejection of Pelati’s application was the expiry of 30 days prescribed period in 
Article 363 of Law on Fiscal Procedure in which the Pelati should at least 30 
days before the transformation envisaged had been carried out, timely apply 
for the grant of tax advantages. According to the disputed decision the relevant 
date of companies’ transformation was the date of subsequent recording of 
that operation in company register which had been done by competent register 
court. Pelati brought proceedings for the annulment of the tax authority deci-
sion in the Administrative Court and argued that the rejection of its applica-
tion as being time-barred as a penalty for failure to observe 30-day time-limit 
laid down by national Law on Fiscal Procedure, was contrary to Article 11 of 
the Directive 90/434 which stipulated main reasons for refusing to apply this 
Directive where the merger, division, transfer of assets or exchange of shares 
operation had as its objective tax evasion or avoidance or resulted in a compa-
ny refusal of benefi ts.50 In short, Pelati argued that this exclusionary time-limit 
set by national law was contrary to EU law. 
shall be liable for any damages arising from such violation. If the damage was caused through 
violation of Articles 6 o 9 of this Act or Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, the court is bound by the fi nal decision determining the existence of 
violation rendered by the Offi ce and the European Commission. This liability does not infringe 
upon the rights and obligations stipulated in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European – See fi rst and second paragraph of Article 62 of Prevention of Restriction of 
Competition Act, ZPOmK-1, Offi cial Gazette RS No. 36/08 with subsequent amendments. 
48  See High Courts decisions VSL I Cpg 229/2011, 18 October 2011; VSK Cpg 216/2012, 22 
February 2013. 
49  Case C-603/10, Pelati d.o.o. v Republika Slovenija, not yet published.  
50  Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation appli-
cable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies 
of different Member States, OJ L 225, p. 1.
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It is important to emphasize that the ECJ qualifi ed the referred question for in-
terpretation of the relevant Directive as a legal dilemma regarding temporal re-
strictions on the enforcement of EU law which concerns the proper application 
of the principle of effectiveness in practice.51 Thus the ECJ in its ruling simply 
relied on previous case-law on time-limits in the context of analyzing the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection of the rights conferred on individuals by 
EU law. Finally, the ECJ held that although Article 11 of the Directive 90/434 
should not be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, it was nevertheless for the national court to as-
certain whether the details of the implementation of that period, and more par-
ticularly the determination of its starting-point of the period, were suffi ciently 
precise, clear and foreseeable to enable taxpayers to ascertain their rights and 
to ensure that they were in a position to enjoy the tax advantages provided for 
by that directive. The ECJ left the fi nal decision on the proper fi nal application 
of effectiveness’ principle to the referring court, which nevertheless confi rmed 
the disputed tax authority decision with argumentation that the starting point 
of the contested 30-day time-limit laid down by national Law on Fiscal Proce-
dure was in no way contrary to the regime of tax advantages provided for by 
Directive 90/434. But, on the contrary, the Supreme Court in a revision (fi led 
by Pelati for revision ground of erroneous application of substantive law) ruled 
that the contested regime was insuffi ciently precise and unclear and therefore 
decided that Pelati’s application could not have been regarded as being time-
barred.52 In conceptual terms it is important that the Supreme Court raised 
the important points of EU law and emphasized the meaning of effet utile in 
national judicial practice.   
4.  DUTY OF LOYAL COOPERATION OF NATIONAL COURTS 
AND PRELIMINARY REFERENCE PROCEDURE
Even though the relationship between national courts and the ECJ under the 
preliminary ruling procedure, covered by Article 267 TFEU is strictly speak-
ing not “considered” as a relevant issue in the context of the effet utile’ appli-
cation before national courts, it is nevertheless scrutinized from a standpoint 
of an actual implementation of private party’s right to effective judicial pro-
tection within EU law. In the decentralized system of enforcement of EU law, 
the preliminary reference procedure is the only mechanism through which 
national courts and the ECJ can engage in a discourse on the appropriate reach 
51  See the administrative court‘s question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, par. 14, 
C-603/10, op. cit. 
52  See Supreme Court decision X Ips 18/2013, 19 September 2013. 
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of EU law when it comes into confl ict with national legal norms.53 Moreover, 
under this mechanism, private parties are vested with the right to challenge the 
validity of EU measures in disputes unfolding at the domestic level.54 
Within ten years of national courts’ practice of their parallel “EU judicial 
mandate, fi ve “referral” decisions had been made under the rules of Article 
267 TFEU. Indeed, this is an adequate statistics, which enables a conclusion 
that domestic courts per se are not avoiding their duty to refer as stipulated in 
Article 267 TFEU and are therefore acting in the line of the »spirit of cooper-
ation which must guide all relations between national courts and the ECJ«.55 
Next to Pelati case, Administrative court also commenced preliminary proce-
dure in Omejc case, in essence concerning the precise meaning of “preventing 
of an on-the spot check” and the “concept of representative” as stipulated by 
the Regulation No. 796/2004.56 Conceptually more interesting was the Deticek 
case in which ECJ in the urgent preliminary procedure ruled on the scope of 
Article 20 of Brussels II regulation since the High Court suspended the pro-
ceeding on the appellate review of a provisional measure regarding custody 
of the child, which was by (national) fi rst instance court given to the mother 
although the Italian court had already previously decided to grant custody of 
the child provisionally to the father.57 The ECJ decided in favor of narrow in-
terpretation and thus fi rmly held that Article 20 of Brussels II regulation must 
be interpreted as not allowing a court of a Member State to take a provisional 
measure in matters of parental responsibility granting custody of a child who 
is in the territory of that Member State to one parent, where a court of another 
Member State, which has jurisdiction under that regulation as to the substance 
of the dispute relating to custody of the child, already delivered a judgment 
provisionally giving custody of the child to the other parent, and that judg-
ment was declared enforceable in the territory of the former Member State. 
Whereas the ECJ’s arguments in the Deticek case are on one hand very logical 
and convincing, it has to be at the same time emphasized that Italian court 
provisionally did not de facto entrust the daughter to the father but placed her 
(temporarily) to in the children’s home of the Calasantian Sisters in Rome. 
Therefore, narrow interpretation of Article 20 of Brussels II regulation in the 
case at hand arguably did not determine the most suitable solution for the 
child. Lastly, the civil department of the Supreme Court referred two requests 
53  Craig, P., de Burca, G., EU Law..., op. cit., p. 442. 
54  Ward, A., Judicial..., op. cit., p. 336.  
55  See par. 70, case C-210/06 CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató bt. [2008] ECR I-09641.
56  Case C-536/09 Marija Omejc v Republika Slovenija [2011] ECR I-5367.
57  Case C-403/09 PPU Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia [2009] ECR I-12193.
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for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, while one of them is still pending.58 In the 
Grilc case,59 however, the Supreme Court sought for a very “technical” inter-
pretation of the exact meaning of the procedure before the compensation body, 
dealing with insurance claims on civil liability in respect of the use of motor 
vehicles, concerning the subsequent claim for compensation before the nation-
al court. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the ECJ with an explanation 
that the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling admitted no 
reasonable doubt, “methodologically” merely decided by reasoned order (not 
judgment) and very briefl y explained the meaning of a stipulated Article 6 of 
the Directive 2000/26 EC.60
From the perspective of national courts’ duty of loyal cooperation are also very 
important the decisions in which national courts have not decided to suspend 
the national proceedings in order to commence the preliminary reference pro-
cedure but have decided themselves on the issues regarding application of EU 
law. As it has been previously discussed, one example is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in which the latter through delineation of the ECJ’s jurisdiction con-
sequently decided not to refer the matter to the ECJ.61 However, this Supreme 
Court’s approach must be critically assessed. The Supreme Court’s rather 
blunt argumentation that the ECJ is in its jurisdiction limited exclusively to ad-
dressing the legal issues regarding the interpretation or validity of EU law and 
therefore cannot rule either on the compliance of national regulation with EU 
law, nor on the validity of national rules, that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of 
national courts, is not quite in the line with vast corpus of ECJ’s jurisprudence 
concerning questions which fall outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ and all oth-
er exceptions to the obligation to refer.62 Further on, it is well-established case 
law that ECJ would be the ultimate decider of its own jurisdiction63 and that it 
58  Case C-162/13 Vnuk.
59  Case C-541/11 Jožef Grilc v Slovensko zavarovalno združenje GIZ, not yet published.
60  »Where a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling  is identical to a question 
on which the Court has already ruled, where the reply to such a question may be clearly de-
duced from existing case-law or where the answer to the question referred for a preliminary 
ruling admits of no reasonable doubt, the Court may at any time, on a proposal from the Judge- 
Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide to rule by reasoned order.« - See 
Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, OJ L 265, p. 25.
61  See Supreme Court decision VIII Ips 295/2011, 4 December 2012; see also this article, p. 9.
62  More about most common exceptions to the obligation to refer such as if the question is 
not relevant, if doctrine of acte éclairé or doctrine acte clair can be applied, see for example 
Broberg, M., Fenger, N., References to the European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010, p. 230. 
63  Case C-244/80 Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello [1981] ECR 3045; Craig, P., de Burca, 
G., EU Law..., op. cit., p. 465.
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strictly declines to rule on a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national 
court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law 
that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or to its purpose, 
where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it 
the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions 
submitted to it.64 Therefore, a more cautious Supreme Court’s approach would 
have been much more precise and legally correct. Indeed, it must be stressed 
that the Supreme Court further on in its reasoning of the case emphasized that 
national courts at the resolving of the collision between the national law and 
EU law should take into consideration the fundamental principles of EU law, 
the ECJ’s case law and especially the requirements of principle of primacy. 
Still, this aforementioned vague Supreme Court’s argumentation in which any 
kind of reference to the ECJ’s jurisprudence is completely left out, from the 
perspective of the principle of legal certainty cannot serve as a proper private 
parties’ guidance in the future disputes concerning accurate delineation of 
jurisdiction between national courts and the ECJ. 
In this vein, the recent Constitutional Court’s decision encompasses a com-
pletely different line of reasoning as it offers an expansive interpretation of 
the national courts’ obligation to give reasons while adjudicating on issues 
concerning the (right) application of EU law and that refusal by a domestic 
court to grant a request for a preliminary reference referral may, in certain cir-
cumstances, infringe the fairness of proceedings.65 This ruling thus represents 
an important “precedence” and sends a clear message to regular courts not 
to obviate their duty of loyal cooperation while acting as “union courts”. The 
case concerned a dispute between National tax authority and a private party 
as plaintiff, which before the Administrative court claimed unlawful double 
taxation of a plot that he bought as a natural person. He argued that the plot 
had been bought for his private use only and thus could not be taxed also as 
a part of assets of his sole trader’s business activity. Throughout the whole 
proceedings he claimed that the ECJ’s case law on value-added tax should be 
considered, according to which a double taxation (such as in the case at hand) 
was precluded. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s revision and thus 
confi rmed the Administrative court’s judgment on the rejection of the claim to 
annul the tax authority decision. In constitutional-complaint proceedings the 
plaintiff as complainant fi nally argued that the Supreme Court’s short reason-
ing about inapplicability of the ECJ’s case law at the case at hand due to the 
different factual and legal circumstances of the case could not be suffi cient in 
64  See par. 67, case C-210/06, op. cit.
65  Constitutional Court decision Up-1056/11-15, 21 November 2013. 
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order to justify complete omission of any reasons why the commencement of 
the preliminary ruling procedure could not change his legal position. 
The Constitutional Court confi rmed that by contested omission the Supreme 
Court breached its obligation to give reasons and this also entailed a violation 
of complainant’s right to judicial protection determined by the fi rst paragraph 
of Article 23 of the Constitution. Most importantly, the Constitutional Court 
captured this diffi culty, noting that national courts, in the specifi c context of 
the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, against whose decisions there is no 
remedy under national law and which refuse to refer to the Court of Justice a 
preliminary question on the interpretation of Community law that has been 
raised before them, are obliged to give reasons for their refusal in the light of 
the exceptions provided for in the case-law of ECJ. The Constitutional Court’s 
thesis is in effect that both Article 23 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the 
ECHR66 clearly impose an obligation on domestic courts to give reasons, in 
the light of the applicable law, for any decisions in which they refuse to refer 
a preliminary question, especially where the applicable law allows for such a 
refusal only on an exceptional basis. Thus by not taking into consideration, 
the complainant’s argument on the relevance of the ECJ’ case law or the cor-
responding need to commence the preliminary reference procedure while de-
ciding on the revision, the Supreme Court violated the complainants’ right to 
judicial protection determined by Article 23 of the Constitution.
5. CONCLUSION
The title of this article is rather axiomatic. Even though private parties’ EU 
rights are effectively enforced (also) on the decentralized level of EU judicial 
system, more decisive and self-confi dent approach of national judges while 
adjudicating on dilemmas of proper enforcement of EU law would doubtlessly 
improve the current situation. The discussion on different aspects of national 
practice regarding effective judicial enforcement of EU law enables us to con-
clude on private parties’ rather modest referral to the effet utile’s requirement 
while litigating before domestic courts. Moreover, albeit national judges are 
generally practicing their EU mandate quite “obediently”, more in-depth and 
comprehensive approach on the issues of enforcement of EU law in the judg-
ments would considerably improve the current state of the predictability of 
the outcomes of legal disputes. Therefore let us conclude that truly “intrusive” 
application of effet utile in national (judicial) practice is yet to come.    
66  The Constitutional Court refers to the ECHR’ case Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. 
Belgium, 3989/07 and 38353/07, 20 September 2011. 
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